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REPUTATION OF A WITNESS FOR
TRUTH AND VERACITY IN CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL CASES*
ROBERT M. CURLEY**
A witness undertaking to testify in an action before a Wisconsin
court, whether the action be civil or criminal, and whether the person
testifying be party in a civil action, accused in a criminal prosecution,
or ordinary witness, lays himself open to an attack by the adverse party
on his general reputation for truth and veracity in the community in
which he lives.
The theory behind the rule is fundamental: In the fact-finding proc-
ess, it is essential that courts and juries be able to repose absolute trust
in the integrity of those relating those facts. The practice of testing that
integrity by permitting a showing of a bad reputation for truth gives
courts and juries what is perhaps the best possible yardstick for gauging
the integrity of a witness-the general feeling of his neighbors and as-
sociates as to his reputation for truth-telling.1
Wisconsin, along with the majority of the states, permits a witness to
be impeached as to his general reputation for truth and veracity only, and
not as to his bad moral character in general. This question was settled
in Wilson v. Young,2 an action for assault and battery. Young was at-
tempting to execute a writ of restitution, and in the process he attempted
to remove a washing machine, on top of which the plaintiff, Wilson, was
securely enthroned. Wilson rose up in anger, wielding a length of chain,
and in the ensuing altercation, Young shot him in the cheek. In the
subsequent assault and battery action, a witness testified that the shot
was fired in malice.
Attempting to impeach this witness, counsel called an impeaching
witness who was questioned about the witness' general character. The
court held that a witness may be impeached only by his general reputa-
tion for truth and veracity. It was held that a witness, in testifying,
puts in issue, in a certain sense, his character for truth and veracity.
The party producing the witness must, therefore, be prepared to sustain
that reputation under attack.
It would be unreasonable, however, to require him to be prepared
to sustain character by.disproving allegations which, in an infinite vari-
* Prepared for publication from a speech given at the Annual Conference of
the Board of Circuit Judges of the State of Wisconsin, at Milwaukee, Wis-
consin.
** Circuit Judge, Milvaukee, Wisconsin. Prepared in collaboration with George
D. Simos, Marquette Law School.
1 See Wilson v. State, 3 Wis. 698 (1854).
2 31 Wis. 574 (1872).
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ety of forms, may tend to discredit the general moral character of the
witness. The court rejected the theory that a single vice possessed by
the witness contaminates his whole moral character, pointing out the
absurdity of such a theory by stating that if it were followed a sabbath
breaker could be considered necessarily a liar; a profane person a
thief; or it could be inferred that an avaricious person was, as a matter
of course, also unchaste.
To prove the bad reputation for truth of a witness by using an im-
peaching witness, a proper foundation must be laid. The general se-
quence of questioning follows this pattern:
The impeaching witness is asked whether he knows the general
reputation for truth and veracity of the witness in his neighborhood;
whether it is good or bad; and if he answers that it is bad, whether,
from his knowledge of that reputation, he would believe the witness
under oath.
Some few states, primarily confined to the south and southwest,
permit questioning to be directed to the issue of the witness' general
moral character, while some apparently do not permit the third ques-
tion: Whether the impeaching witness would believe him under oath.3
Wisconsin joined the ranks of those states permitting this question
to be asked in 1854.1 Defendants in that case were convicted of rioting.
The trial court had excluded a question put by defendants' counsel to
an impeaching witness as to whether he would believe the witness under
oath. The impeaching witness had testified that he had known the wit-
ness sought to be impeached for sixteen years, was acquainted with the
rieighborhood in which he lived, and knew that his general reputation
for truth and veracity among his neighbors and acquaintances was bad.
Using some colorful language, the court held the question should
have been permitted. "When the source is polluted, the stream cannot
be pure," the court declared, and added that to allow the impeaching
witness to testify he would not believe him under oath, informs the jury
as to the degree of reliance which persons acquainted with the impeached
witness would place upon his sworn statements. "What better or more
convincing evidence of a man's utter unfitness to testify or speak the
truth in a matter concerning the lives, liberties or properties of his
neighbors can be produced than the solemn statement of those who
know him, that they would not believe him upon his oath ?"5
The court answered the contention that a statement of such a belief
could be only opinion of the impeaching witness and therefore should
be excluded by holding that instead of an opinion such an expression of
belief is a statement of conviction produced by the impeached witness'
3 See 58 Am. Jur. W'itnesses §730 (1948).




common reputation, and that the belief may be founded upon general
reputation only, and not, for example, upon specific acts of the witness.
Obviously, an impeaching witness may testify only as to his personal
knowledge of the reputation for truth of the witness sought to be im-
peached. This principle was illustrated clearly in Cullen v. Hanisch.6
In attempting to impeach the plaintiff, who testified in his own be-
half, defendant's counsel asked an impeaching witness whether at a
previous trial in which plaintiff was a party, eighteen witnesses were
present who stated they would not believe the plaintiff under oath. The
court treated this question summarily, stating that to permit this form
of questioning would be to admit the merest hearsay.
While the foundation for the introduction of evidence bearing on
the impeached witness' general reputation for truth and veracity in his
community need not go beyond asking the sequence of questions pre-
viously listed, the scope of cross-examination, in testing the source and
extent of the impeaching witness' knowledge of the reputation, is broad.7
For example, cross-examination may extend to his opportunity for
knowing the reputation of the witness, the length of time, the generality
of the unfavorable reports, the persons from whom he heard them,
whether he has also heard conflicting statements that the witness is
truthful and whether he has heard reports of other constituent elements
of a good moral character which might tend to color his belief on the
witness' reputation for truth; as, for example, whether he' has heard
the witness had been arrested for a crime.8
The most recent case in Wisconsin involving impeachment of a
witness' reputation for truth and veracity by means of an impeaching
witness is State v. Baker?
Defendant was convicted in the trial court of indecent behavior with
a minor.1" The only evidence of guilt presented by the prosecution was
the uncorroborated testimony of the fifteen-year-old cooperating minor,
with successful prosecution of the case, therefore, hinging solely on the
jury's belief of the boy's story.
The defendant called a minister who was a former teacher of the
boy, and asked if he knew what was the boy's reputation for truth and
veracity in the community. The question was excluded on objection,
with the trial court giving defendant's counsel time during a recess to
come up with some authority for his position. None was forthcoming,
and the objection stood. The court stated that when the trial court per-
mitted the state to shut out evidence bearing on the boy's reputation for
truthfulness, under the circumstances of the trial, it was an error going
6 114 Wis. 24, 89 N.W. 900 (1902).
7 See Duffy v. Radke, 138 Wis. 38, 119 N.W. 811 (1902).8 See 58 Am. Jur. Witnesses §732 (1948).
9 16 Wis. (2d) 364, 114 N.W. (2d) 426 (1962).
10 Wis. Stat. §944.11(3) (1961).
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to the heart of defendant's guilt or innocence. The jury should have
been permitted to hear evidence of the boy's reputation for truth in his
community.
The case is perhaps the clearest statement by the court that trial
court error relating to evidence tending to impeach the reputation of
the witness may be grounds for reversal. In view of the wide discretion
exercised by the trial courts in this area, many of the previous state-
ments were either painstakingly qualified by pointing out that reversal
was called for on other grounds or were mere expressions of disap-
proval of a trial court ruling which was found not to be an abuse of
discretion.
Once the reputation of a witness for truth and veracity has been
attacked in impeachment, the party producing the witness may re-
habilitate or bolster that reputation by introducing evidence of his own
that the witness' reputation was good.
In State v. Wrosch,1' Mrs. Wrosch was charged with the murder
of her husband. He died in August of 1949, with the death certificate
listing cancer as the cause of death. Acting on some unspecified in-
formation, the body was exhumed, and an autopsy showed a high con-
centration of lead arsenate, an easily procured plant spray, in his body.
At the trial, one Mrs. Pederson testified that in the course of a dis-
cussion of Mrs. Pederson's marital difficulties, Mrs. Wrosch had told
her to get rid of him in the same way that she, Mrs. Wrosch, had got
rid of hers; by giving him enough arsenic to kill an ox.
The defendant called five witnesses who testified that Mrs. Peder-
son's reputation for truth and veracity was bad. In rebuttal the State
produced five who testified it was good, but three of these stated that
their testimony was based on their own information and not on what
others had told them.
The court, on appeal, agreed with defendant in principle that while
testimony attacking the reputation of a witness for truth and veracity
may be counteracted by testimony that the reputation is good, the inquiry
on either side is ordinarily limited to general reputation and not mere
opinion.
Illustrating the attitude of the supreme court toward trial court
discretion in this area, the court stated that while the defective re-
habilitating testimony might have been stricken, it will not find an abuse
of the trial court's discretion, particularly since the effect of the testi-
mony could not have been prejudicial. The key, then, to whether error
will be found to constitute grounds for reversal is whether under the
circumstances of the case the error was prejudicial.
In the Baker case, where the testimony of only one witness con-
victed the defendant of a disgusting and disgraceful crime, the error
11262 Wis. 104, 53 N.W. (2d) 779 (1952).
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was obviously prejudicial. In the Wrosch case, where ample evidence of
guilt existed, though much of it was circumstantial, any question as to
the reputation of the witness for truth and veracity was at best aca-
demic.
When the reputation of the witness for truthfulness is not put under
attack by the adverse party, no reputation evidence tending to bolster
his testimony may be admitted. The rule was well stated in Johnson v.
State :12 ,,... it is quite elementary that a witness is not to he supported
by proof of his having a good reputation for truth and veracity till his
reputation in that regard shall have been directly attacked. That rule is
the logical result of the other one that the law presumes every person
to be reputed truthful till evidence shall have been produced to the
contrary .. .," and to attempt to establish the witness' reputation, which
needs no support other than the legal presumption, is a useless act.
As witnesses cannot be called expressly to testify to the good reputa-
tion of one whose reputation has not been attacked, neither may wit-
nesses being questioned directly as to the merits be incidentally asked
about that reputation.
In Volk v. Flatz,13 an action to recover unpaid salary in which the
weight to be given to plaintiff's testimony by the jury was of crucial
importance, just such a strategem was attempted by plaintiff's counsel.
The court held, simply, that as the defendant had never offered testi-
mony on the subject of plaintiff's reputation, the door had not been
opened for plaintiff's introduction of such testimony.
Even though cross-examination of a party who testifies in his own
behalf may be extensive, searching and penetrating, to the extent of
casting doubt on the accuracy or truthfulness of his testimony, that
party may not offer testimony as to his good reputation to dispel the
effects of the cross-examination.
The principle was established in McCauley v. Balsley,'4 an action
for personal injuries suffered when the plaintiff's car collided with a
street car in Milwaukee.
After the plaintiff's testimony as to her sufferings was bitingly
scrutinized in cross-examination, the trial court permitted her pastor
to support her testimony by stating that her reputation for truth and
veracity was good, and that he would believe her under oath.
The court held that the minister's testimony should not have been
admitted, since there had been no direct attack on her character through
impeachment. It was stated that even though searching cross-examina-
tion may have developed doubt as to her testimony, each witness must
be his own support of his veracity until there has been an effort to
12 129 Wis. 146 at 154, 108 N.W. 55 at 58 (1906).
13 206 Wis. 270, 239 N.W. 424 (1931).
1.4242 Wis. 528, 8 N.W. (2d) 299 (1943).
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impeach his character, and that the accuracy of the witness' statements
is to be tested by her presence and testimony at trial.
As a final principle governing impeachment of witnesses by testi-
mony as to their general reputation for truth and veracity, it should be
pointed out that one may not impeach his own witness through the use
of such reputation evidence.
In Collins v. Hoehle, 5 the court pointed out that the impeaching
party had called the witness voluntarily, without any obligation to do
so, thus implying that one who calls a witness without knowing what
she is going to say should generally suffer the consequences in stern
and noble, if painful, silence. The rule was stated that while a party
may show that testimony of his own witness is false in a material mat-
ter, he may not impeach the witness by direct testimony, either of his
bad reputation for veracity, or by the introduction of prior inconsistent
statements.
The above statements apply with equal generality to civil and
criminal actions alike when a witness is sought to be impeached as to
his truthful repute through the use of an impeaching witness.
In cross-examination, however, a significantly broader field of in-
quiry is allowed counsel, who may attack the credibility of the witness
with questions concerning past misconduct having a bearing on veracity.
Perhaps the widest discretion in the general area of credibility and ver-
acity of witnesses is exercised by the trial judges in this specific field
of cross-examination as to past acts of misconduct.
In contrast to the scope of inquiry permitted when an impeached
witness is utilized, counsel may ask about specific acts of misconduct.
The requirement that these acts must have some bearing on the witness'
character for veracity was established in Dungan v. State,16 which also
clearly illustrates the extent of the trial judge's discretion in allowing
this type of cross-examination.
The family involved in that case could hardly be called pillars of the
church or leaders of the community's aspirations for a better moral en-
vironment; the defendant, who was convicted of assault with intent to
rape his minor stepdaughter, was a long-time operator of bawdy houses
in Chicago and Milwaukee, and his wife, the complainant's mother, was
a veteran prostitute.
During the trial, the State on cross-examination propounded three
categories of questions: the first tending to insinuate that the defendant
had conducted or lived in houses of prostitution; the second that his
wife was a prostitute, and the third that the parties lived in a house of
prostitution at the time the offense was committed.
15 99 Wis. 639, 75 N.W. 416 (1898).
16 135 Wis. 151, 115 N.W. 350 (1908).
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Defendant contended on appeal that all three classes of questions
should not have been admitted. The court stated that evidence of dis-
graceful, immoral or criminal conduct of the accused unconnected with
the crime charged is wholly inadmissible on the issue of guilt, because
the jury may not infer from evidence of general bad character or spe-
cific misconduct that the accused committed the crime charged. Since
it is practically impossible to prevent such an inference once such evi-
dence has been given, the trial court must suppress such questioning
with whatever explanation to the jury is required to remove its ill ef-
fects, or reversal is called for.
The accused, however, is not only the defendant, but a witness, once
he chooses to testify in his own behalf, and he is, therefore, subject to
the same rules as other witnesses as to cross-examination which may
impair his credibility. It was held that a witness may be questioned on
the morality of his past life, on the assumption that immorality may
have a bearing on his character for veracity, but such information is
relevant to the question of veracity only. The rule possesses wide pos-
sibility of abuse by counsel, and when any attorney goes so far as to
outrage the feelings and reputation of the witness, with the resulting
embarrassment of the courts because of the understandable reluctance
of witnesses to subject themselves to insult and ridicule, the trial court
must protect both the witness and the forum from being debased into
an area of mere scandal. CROSS EXAMINATION TO ASCERTAIN
THE CHARACTER FOR VERACITY OF WITNESSES, THERE-
FORE, MAY SAFELY BE LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF
THE TRIAL JUDGES.
In testing the specific questions involved in the Dungan case by the
standards set out, it was held that while whether a witness has in the
past conducted a disreputable business ordinarily bears only slightly
upon his character for veracity, the court refused to say that to permit
the questioning was an abuse of the broad discretion vested in the trial
judges.
Questions as to the wife's career in prostitution, however, could un-
der no stretch of the imagination be relevant to the veracity of the ac-
cused, and the court reversed the conviction on this ground.
The contrast between the narrow limitations on impeachment evi-
dence bearing on reputation for truth and the almost all-encompassing
field of inquiry allowed in cross-examination is well illustrated by com-
paring the Dungan case with Robinson v. State,17 a prosecution for
statutory rape.
Defendant introduced evidence of good character of himself and as
to the respectable character of his business, a candy and variety store
(such evidence is relevant to the claimed innocence of the accused; the
17 143 Wis. 205, 126 N.W. 750 (1910).
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charge in itself is an attack on his character justifying use of character
evidence).
In rebuttal the state offered evidence of defendant's past history of
libidinous acts and lewd suggestions with and to girls and young women
who patronized his store. The state's justification on appeal was that
this evidence of specific immoral acts went to refute the defendant's
character evidence. The court stated the rule, in contrast to what may
be elicited on cross-examination, that such refutation must consist of
proof of general reputation, and that specific acts are not admissible.
The evidence was held properly admitted, however, on another ground.
To further illustrate that the supreme court on appeal will not
lightly find that the trial judge has abused his discretion in the control
of cross-examination, refer to the State v. Nergaard,18 a prosecution for
violation of fish and game laws by taking and transporting illegal
amounts of fish.
After the defendant testified in his own behalf, he was asked on
cross-examination whether it was true that while in business in another
city he had been under constant surveillance by state officers who on
occasion took fish from his possession. The court agreed with defend-
ant's argument that even under the considerable discretion of the trial
courts, questions regarding previous supposed (as distinguished from
convictions) crimes were not allowed. However, it was held that "it
has been wisely deemed that both court and jury are entitled to know
the manner of life of the witness to a reasonable extent-where he has
been and what have been his occupations, and the circumstances under
which he has lived."
"We are unable to say that there was any abuse of discretion in this
respect in the present case." 19
The question of what constitutes past misconduct bearing on char-
acter for veracity was raised in Ketchingman v. State.20
The case involved a prosecution for adultery, instituted by complaint
of the husband of one Caroline White, defendant's long-time inamorata
and the other party whose presence was, of course, necessary to the
perpetration of the crime. Mrs. White, who was understandably the sole
witness to the illegal acts complained of, was the prosecution's chief
witness. On cross-examination defendant's counsel questioned her at
tedious and repetitious length as to times, places and circumstances un-
der which the forbidden act was committed. Recognizing that the previ-
ous unchastity of the complaining witness is a proper subject for cross-
examination in cases involving sexual offenses, the court upheld the
validity of this line of questioning. But when counsel asked Mrs. White
28 124 Wis. 414, 102 N.W. 899 (1905).
i1 Id. at 423.
206 Wis. 417 (1857).
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whether defendant or anyone else had ever produced an abortion upon
her, he went too far. The question was irrelevant and properly over-
ruled, since it had no reference to the fact of adultery, the matter in
issue.
Mrs. White had definitively established the limits of her chastity
with her own admissions, and evidence to impeach the character of a
witness is commonly confined to his general character for veracity. The
dissent pointed out that the case presented a situation fraught with peril
to defendants who could too easily be victims of well-planned con-
spiracies perpetrated by "injured" husbands and dissolute wives.
The dissent stated that the case presented ". . . the disgusting spec-
tacle of the husband becoming the prosecutor of the defendant for
adultery with his wife, and calling upon the wife, the sole witness ...
to sustain the prosecution." 21 To guard against this danger, the dissent
urged that cross-examination should not be too critically circumscribed
in these circumstances.
To conclude this section it should be pointed out that one cannot do
indirectly through cross-examination, despite its broad scope, what he
could not do directly through impeachment of the witness' reputation
for truth through an impeaching witness.
This principle was stated in Cullen v. Hanisch,22 in which counsel
asked plaintiff on cross-examination whether at his divorce trial some
years before six witnesses had testified that his reputation for veracity
was bad and that they would not believe him under oath. The practice
was struck down as calling for a hearsay statement and not a proper
way of impeaching a plaintiff as a witness in his own behalf.
MORAL: Find your own testators as to the witness' penchant for
exaggeration and myth-making; don't rely on those someone else used
at another time, another place.
A final method of affecting the credibility of a witness, or accused
in a criminal trial, whether he testifies or not, is by proving a previous
conviction of a crime. The right is created by statute as a corollary of
the law making a convict a competent witness, removing his common-
law disability. 23 The question of what constitutes a "conviction of a
criminal offense" has created some problems in definition.
In Farrell v. Phillips,2 4 for example, an action for malicious prosecu-
tion, the luckless defendant was asked on cross-examination whether he
had not been convicted and fined for contempt of court some twelve
years previously for taking a juryman in an action to which he was a
party on a fun outing in a house of ill fame. Defendant was naturally
reluctant to admit that the friendly night out took place in a bawdy
21 Id. at 424.
22 114 Wis. 24, 89 N.W. 900 (1902).
23 Wis. Stat. §325.19 (1961).
24 140 Wis. 611, 123 N.W. 117 (1909).
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house, whereupon counsel for plaintiff proceeded to read into the record
all of the proceedings in the contempt action, from complaint to judg-
ment.
The court reversed a plaintiff's judgment on this basis, holding that
a conviction for contempt of court, whether civil or criminal, is not a
conviction of a criminal offense which may be proved to affect the wit-
ness' credibility. Even if it were, the court continued, the proof should
consist only of the record of the conviction or judgment, and not the
full record of the case.
Finally, on the alternative question of whether the procedure should
have been permitted as an exercise of the cross-examination right of
inquiry into the witness' previous life, habits and occupations in order
to throw light on his veracity, the court held that this right did not ex-
tend to a single, isolated act of contempt of court, committed twelve
years prior, and that furthermore, the fact of the conviction's remote-
ness in time alone should bar its admission.
As the Farrell case indicated, the method of proving the prior con-
viction is rather rigidly confined. This fact was further illustrated in
Cullen v. Hanisch,25 in which plaintiff on cross-examination was asked
whether he had ever spent time in jail. It was held that the question was
properly excluded, since plaintiff was not asked whether he had ever
been convicted of any criminal offense, and the statute authorizes only
proof of such conviction as going to affect the witness' credibility.
A final aspect of the statutory right to prove prior convictions is the
inherent right of the witness to explain the conviction or rehabilitate
his credibility. Rice v. State,26 was a prosecution for taking indecent
liberties with a minor female.
In the course of the trial the defendant was asked by the district
attorney if he had ever been convicted of a crime. The next question
related to the nature of the crime for which he had been convicted, and
when defendant launched an explanation of the circumstances, the trial
court cut him off and asked what he had been charged with. The court
reversed, stating that where such evidence of the nature of a former
conviction is admitted, the defendant must be allowed to make a general
explanation. In ordering a new trial, the court noted that even such a
general explanation would not have relieved the prejudice in this case,
particularly because of the emphasis given the conviction by the judge's
questions to the accused.
When proof of a former conviction is admitted, the witness has the
right to introduce witnesses to testify to his good reputation for truth
and veracity. In Kralmer v. State," defendant testified on cross-exami-
25 Supra note 22.
26 195 Wis. 181, 217 N.W. 697 (1928).
27 117 Wis. 350, 93 N.W. 1072 (1903).
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nation that he had been convicted of horse thievery in Indiana and
spent eighteen months in prison. He subsequently called a reputation
witness, but the testimony was excluded on the state's objection. The
state contended that the evidence was inadmissible because the defend-
ant's reputation for truth and veracity had not been attackgd.
The court, however, held that the statute permitting proof of prior
convictions exists simply for the purpose of affecting credibility; in
other words, to impeach the witness. "It is simply a method of impeach-
ing for truth and veracity,"28 and when a witness is impeached, whether
by reputation witnesses or proof of former conviction, witnesses may
be introduced to testify to his good character.
The court's interpretation of the statute makes it obvious that, for
defendant's counsel in a criminal proceeding, at any rate, valor for once
takes precedence over discretion. It would seem that the better practice
would be to have the defendant-witness make a simple recital of the fact
of his previous convictions on direct-examination, thus limiting the pros-
ecution's scope of inquiry on cross-examination and precluding the ad-
mission into evidence of specific facts showing the nature and circum-
stances of the previous convictions, facts which, by their very nature,
tend to prejudice the jury against the defendant.
This, however, is solely a question of tactics of counsel; one area
in which the trial court's discretion does not operate to guide a course
of action. The rule that the prosecution may not inquire into the nature
of the prior conviction when the defendant has testified that he has been
previously convicted on direct-examination was expressed in State v.
Adams.29
The Adams case does not in terms make this rule applicable to civil
actions in which the wrongdoer is a party, and Judge Neelan, in a paper
prepared for our Summer Conference, expressed the possibility that
the court may limit the Adams Rule to state cases. In fact, Judge Neelan
states that the trial court itself could so rule.
28 Id. at 353.
29257 Wis. 433, 43 N.W. (2d) 446 (1950).
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